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HIS article will review the most significant decisions rendered
during the last term by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and
the United States Supreme Court. Both courts continue the trend




In Guerra v. Garza,1 the court found that the relator was entitled to
writs of mandamus and prohibition from the court ordering the county
judge to vacate an order changing the status of a bond from surety to
personal.2 In this unique situation, a municipal judge set a surety bond,
and subsequently the county judge, on his own motion, conducted bail
review hearings to remedy chronic jail overcrowding problems. If an in-
mate had been incarcerated for ten or more days, the judge would review
the nature of the bond. In this instance, no writ of habeas corpus had
been filed by the prisoner.
The appellate court, although recognizing the county judge's motives as
laudable, found them to be premature and without authority.3 The court
voiced some concerns at the prospect of forum shopping to either reduce
or increase bail amounts. 4
B. SEVERANCE
The court of criminal appeals addressed when a motion to sever under
section 3.04(a) of the Penal Code must be filed in order to be considered
timely in Thornton v. State.5 The defendant was charged in a two-count
indictment with aggravated sexual assault and indecency with a child, and
both offenses involved the same victim on or about the same date. After
jury selection and immediately before arraignment, the defendant re-
quested the court to require the State to elect on which count the defen-
dant would be prosecuted. The court denied the request.6 The defendant
next asked for a severance of counts, which motion was denied. 7
The court recognized that section 3.04(a) does not establish the timing
of a motion to sever.8 However, articles 27.029 and 28.0110 of the Texas
1. 987 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (en banc).
2. See id. at 594.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. 986 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
6. See id. at 616.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN (Vernon 1989).
10. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. (Vernon 1989).
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Code of Criminal Procedure do provide for the raising and timing of the
defendant's pleadings and motions."1 In the absence of a pretrial hearing,
"logic and reason dictate" that the motion to sever must be raised before
trial.12 The primary motivation for filing such a motion is to limit the
State's evidence to one offense. Logically speaking, a defendant would
be prejudiced if the State and the defendant questioned prospective ju-
rors as to the elements of each offense and the respective punishment
ranges, but the scope of the trial was later limited to one offense. The
pretrial presentation of the motion to sever provides both parties with
adequate notice in advance of trial as to which witnesses will be needed,
which the defenses will apply and what evidence will be presented. Thus,
the defendant's motion to sever in this case was untimely because it was
not made before trial. 13
C. VENUE
In Gutierrez v. State,14 the court held that the defendant's motion for
change of venue was waived when the defendant "ceased to advocate or
advance his position that he wanted a hearing to establish his right to a
change of venue as a matter of fact."15 The record showed that several
pretrial hearings were set prior to a rescheduled January 24, 1995 trial
date on a murder indictment. On the very date of trial the defendant
filed a motion for change of venue which was summarily denied. The
trial court later explained to the defendant that this motion had been
untimely filed. The trial court, however, granted the continuance and
thereafter several pretrial hearings took place. On each occasion, the de-
fendant specifically refused to present the motion or any evidence in sup-
port thereof, not withstanding that the State had filed controverting
affidavits following the January 24, 1995 pretrial setting. The appellate
court essentially found that the defendant had waived his motion for
change of venue because of his lack of persistence in presenting same to
the court.
The court emphasized that the trial court's decision to hold in abeyance
its ruling was perfectly acceptable, that no real final decision was entered
regarding the denial of the defendant's motion to change venue. The
court distinguished Gutierrez from Revia v. State.16 In Revia, after a pre-
trial conference was held where the case was reset for trial on December
5, the defendant filed a motion for change of venue on December 4. The
defendant's motion was summarily denied as being untimely. The State
11. Specifically, article 27.02 addresses pleadings, and subsection 8 incorporates any
and all motions or pleadings which the law permits to be filed, which would include a
motion to sever. Article 28.01 addresses the timeliness of the defendant's pleadings in
relationship to a pretrial hearing.
12. Thornton, 986 S.W.2d at 618.
13. See id.
14. 979 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc).
15. Id. at 663.
16. 649 S.W.2d 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
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did not controvert the motion and the court did not grant a hearing on
the motion. The appellate court held that it was reversible error to over-
rule a motion for change of venue without a hearing and without the
motion being controverted by the State. 17
D. VENUE AS AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE
In Jones v. State,t 8 wherein the defendant was convicted of theft by
receiving19 the question presented was whether the proper venue for
prosecution was governed by article 13.0820 or 13.1821 of the Texas Code
of Criminal Procedure. A camera store in College Station, Brazos
County, was burglarized and eight cameras stolen. Four of the cameras
were recovered from pawn shops in Austin, Travis County. Several indi-
viduals approached the defendant at his home in Burleson County, which
bordered on Brazos County. Thereafter the defendant, using his drivers
license, pawned the property in Travis County at various pawn shops.
The defendant moved for an instructed verdict because no evidence was
presented to show that the defendant was connected in any way to the
burglary in Brazos County. The State argued that article 13.08 applied
and that venue was proper in Brazos County because the stolen property
traveled from that county to Burleson County where the defendant re-
ceived it.
The court held that venue for theft by receiving under section 31.03 of
the Texas Penal Code is controlled by article 13.08.22 Venue attached at
the time and place the offender took control of the property in Burleson
County, and could also attach in any county where the offender removed
the property such as Travis County. As the State failed to prove the de-
fendant committed the offense in question in Brazos County, the court
held that a judgment of acquittal must be entered.23
E. PROPER VENUE FOR AGGRAVATED THEFTS
In State v. Weaver,24 the defendant was indicted in Harris County for
theft of between $20,000 and $100,000 dollars. Pursuant to section
31.0925 of the Texas Penal Code, the indictment aggregated into a single
offense various thefts from thirty-two different complainants occurring
over several years in and around Harris County. The State alleged that
these thefts were "pursuant to one scheme and continuing course of con-
17. See id. at 627. Whether this decision would remain viable today is somewhat ques-
tionable in the view of the compelling concurring opinion by Judge Keller in Guiterrez. See
Guiterrez, 979 S.W.2d at 664.
18. 979 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc).
19. TEXAS PEN. CODE § 31.03(a)(n)(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
26. TEX. CODE GRIM. PROC. ANN. (Vernon 1977).
21. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN (Vernon 1977).
22. See Jones, 979 S.W.2d at 657.
23. See id. at 658-59.
24. 982 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc).
25. TEXAS PEN. CODE ANN. (Vernon 1994).
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duct."'26 The defendant's motion to sever the non-Harris County thefts
from the indictment was granted, which resulted in a reduction in the
punishment range.
The court held that when a number of thefts are aggregated into a sin-
gle offense under section 31.09, the proper county for criminal prosecu-
tion under article 13.18 is "any county in which the individual thefts or
any elements thereof occurred. '2 7 The court previously held that section
31.09 created one offense for purposes of severance, jurisdiction, punish-
ment, and limitations.28 In this case, the court holds that this section cre-
ates one offense for purposes of venue.29
F. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss based upon
double jeopardy grounds in Vick v. State.30 The first indictment for aggra-
vated sexual assault alleged the defendant caused penetration of the fe-
male sexual organ of a child by the defendant's sexual organ. The
defendant was acquitted. The second indictment for aggravated sexual
assault alleged that the defendant caused the female sexual organ of the
child to contact the mouth of the defendant. The trial court ruled that the
second indictment charged the same offense for which the defendant had
been tried and acquitted. The court of appeals affirmed. The Court of
Criminal Appeals held that the two indictments alleged violations of sep-
arate and distinct statutory provisions and that the two indictments al-
leged separate and distinct acts.31 Thus, the court held no double
jeopardy violation occurred. 32
Two separate indictments charging attempted murder were a subject
of double jeopardy review in Manrique v. State.33 Each indictment al-
leged the attempted murder of a person or persons unknown to the grand
jury by shooting at them with a deadly weapon and the attempted murder
of two named individuals. The facts showed that the defendant and an-
other went to a specific house thought to be occupied by a member of a
rival gang, where the defendant fired a rifle multiple times into the house.
The named complainants were wounded; other occupants escaped injury.
The jury returned a general form of verdict in each case. 34 The court of
26. Id. at 893.
27. Weaver at 893.
28. See id. at 894.
29. See id.
30. 991 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
31. See id. at 833.
32. The court reviewed the applicable statute, article 22.021 of the Texas Penal Code
and concluded that the statute was a conduct-oriented statute and utilized the conjunctive
in distinguishing different types of conduct. Each subsection specifically defined sexual
conduct in a way that required different acts to commit. Clearly, the acts differed from the
first to the second indictment. The court held that the legislature intended that each sepa-
rately described conduct constituted a "separate statutory offense." Id.
33. 994 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (en banc).
34. The jury found the defendant guilty of attempted murder without specifying which
paragraph the jury found to be true.
2000]
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appeals held that the convictions violated double jeopardy. 35 The Court
of Criminal Appeals held that the evidence was more than sufficient to
support a finding of guilt under either paragraph of each indictment. 36
Notwithstanding, that the court's charge contained only an abstract in-
struction on the law of transferred intent without an application para-
graph, the evidence may not be held insufficient because of a defect in
the court's charge. 37
In State v. Sauceda,38 the court reviewed the process by which a court
should apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Two men were shot
seconds apart as they sat in a vehicle. Charged as a principal in two mur-
der indictments, the defendant was found not guilty in the first case. The
defendant was reindicted in the second case based on the law of parties.
The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss and pretrial
writ 39 based upon collateral estoppel. The court of appeals reversed, 40
holding that the trial court did not have the authority to grant a motion to
dismiss an indictment on the basis of collateral estoppel and that prosecu-
tion of the defendant in the second case was not barred by collateral es-
toppel. The Court of Criminal Appeals emphasized that Ashe v.
Swenson4l required an appellate court to examine the record of a prior
proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and
other relevant matters in order to conclude whether a rational jury could
have based its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant
sought to foreclose from consideration. In this case, the court of appeals
did not properly follow the Ashe procedure as it did not consider the
evidence developed at the first trial. Instead it focused only upon the
pleadings and the court's charge. The court remanded the case to the
court of appeals to adequately address the collateral estoppel issue in ac-
cordance with the procedure mandated in Ashe.42
An issue of first impression in Texas, whether homicide offenses (man-
slaughter and intoxication manslaughter) which are distinct under Block-
burger v. United States43 may nevertheless be considered the "same" for
purposes of the "multiple punishment" aspect of the double jeopardy
clause, was addressed in Ervin v. State.44 Pursuant to a plea bargain, the
35. The court of appeals assumed that the defendant was convicted under the first
paragraph of each indictment. The court concluded that the two convictions of the defen-
dant for identical counts of attempted murder violated the double jeopardy clause and
constituted multiple punishment for the same offense.
36. See Manrique, 994 S.W.2d at 642.
37. The Court of Criminal Appeals faulted the assumption of the court of appeals,
noting that when a general verdict is returned by a jury and the evidence is sufficient to
support a finding under any of the paragraphs submitted to the jury, the verdict will be
applied to the particular paragraph finding support in the facts. See id.
38. 980 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc).
39. More commonly referred to as a pretrial application for a writ of habeas corpus.
40. See Sauceda, 980 S.W.2d at 643.
41. 397 U.S. 436, 444 (1970).
42. See Sauceda, 980 S.W.2d at 647.
43. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
44. 991 S.W.2d 804 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
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defendant was convicted of intoxication manslaughter and manslaughter
in a two-count indictment arising out of a traffic accident involving a sin-
gle victim on the same date. The trial court imposed a twenty-five year
sentence in each case to run concurrently. In a pro se application for writ
of habeas corpus, the defendant argued that permitting both convictions
for a single instance of conduct violated the Fifth Amendment's protec-
tion against double jeopardy.
Manslaughter and intoxication manslaughter are clearly not the same
offense under the Blockburger test. Manslaughter requires "reckless-
ness" which is not required for intoxication manslaughter. 45 Intoxication
manslaughter requires "intoxication" and "operation of a motor vehicle
in a public place," neither of which are required for manslaughter. 46 The
question remained as to whether these two offenses be considered the
same for double jeopardy purposes.
The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that Blockburger was not
the sole test as to whether offenses are the same under the multiple pun-
ishment aspect of the double jeopardy clause.47 The primary inquiry is
"whether the legislature intended to permit multiple punishments. '48 Af-
ter recounting relevant considerations,49 the court concluded that man-
slaughter and intoxication manslaughter are the same offense for double
jeopardy purposes when they involve the same victim, and imposing con-
victions for both, therefore, violates the double jeopardy clause.50
G. INDICTMENT
In Garcia v. State,51 the defendant was charged with indecency with a
child in three separate indictments, which alleged that "on or about" Oc-
tober 5, 1987, August 15, 1989, and May 15, 1990, certain criminal activity
occurred. The defendant complained that each indictment failed to spec-
ify a more exact date and thus deprived the defendant of sufficient notice
of the time periods involved. The court held that an indictment need not
specify the precise date the charged offense occurred as time is not a
45. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 49.08 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
46. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 19.04 (Vernon 1994).
47. See Ervin, 991 S.W.2d at 814.
48. Id. at 814.
49. Other considerations relevant to determining whether the legislature intended
multiple punishments are whether the offenses provisions: "(1) are contained within the
same statutory section; (2) are phrased in the alternative; (3) are named similarly; (4) have
common punishment ranges; (5) have a common focus (i.e. whether the 'gravamen' of the
offense is the same); (6) have a common focus tends to indicate a single instance of con-
duct. Additional considerations are whether the elements that differ between the offenses
can be considered "the 'same' under an imputed theory of liability which would result in
the offenses being considered the same under Blockburger (i.e. a liberalized Blockburger
standard utilizing imputed elements), and whether there is legislative history containing an
articulation of an intent to treat the offenses as the same or different for double jeopardy
purposes." Ervin at 814.
50. See id. at 817. The court found that the State waived the illegal portion of the
judgment, and therefore the court granted the applicant relief insofar as the manslaughter
conviction was vacated.
51. 981 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc).
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material element of the offense. Instead, the primary purpose served by
the date is to demonstrate that the prosecution is not barred by the stat-
ute of limitations, and on occasions the State may not be able to show
precisely when the alleged offense occurred. 52
In State v. Mason,53 the trial court granted the defendant's motion to
quash the indictment which alleged unlawful possession of a firearm by a
felon under section 46.04.54 The trial court granted the motion to quash,
ruling that the prosecution was controlled by former section 4.605. 55
The Court of Criminal Appeals, however, after reviewing the legisla-
tive history of the sections, concluded that only the defendant's status as a
felon, not the date upon which the prior felony conviction occurred, was
an element of section 46.04.56
In Gibson v. State,57 involving a third prosecution felony driving while
intoxicated , the defendant filed a motion to quash the enhancement
count of his indictment, arguing that both prior involuntary manslaughter
52. In those few cases in which a defendant is unfairly surprised at trial, the defen-
dant's appropriate remedy is a continuance. In this case, the defendant did not allege or
show unfair surprise or moved for a continuance.
53. 980 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc).
54. The indictment alleged in part that the defendant, on or about September 6, 1996,
intentionally and knowingly possessed at a location other than the premises where he lived
at the time a firearm, and, prior to the possession, the defendant had been finally convicted
of a felony, namely burglary of motor vehicle on July 10, 1991 in a specified court and
cause number. The defendant argued and the trial court agreed the date of the prior con-
viction was an essential element of the offense and that date preceded September 1, 1994,
the effective date for the application of section 46.04 and, therefore, section 46.05 gov-
erned. Therefore, the indictment was defective because it failed to allege the prior felony
conviction involved violence or the threat of violence as required under section 46.05. The
court of appeals affirmed.
55. Former section 46.05 of the penal code provided that: "the person that had been
convicted of a felony involving an act of violence or threatened violence to a person or
property commits and offense if he possesses a firearm away from the premises he lives."
Act of May 24, 1973, 63rd Leg., R.S., ch. 399, § 1, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 883, 964, amended
by Act of May 29, 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, § 1.01, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 3586, 3688. In
1993, the Texas Legislature amended 46.05, now set forth in section 46.04:
A person who has been convicted of a felony commits an offense if he pos-
sesses a firearm:
(1) after conviction and before the fifth anniversary of the person's
release from confinement following conviction of the felony or the
person's release from supervision under community supervision, PA-
ROLE, or mandatory supervision, whichever date is later; or
(2) after the period described by subdivision (1), at any location other
than the premises at which the person lives.
TEX. PEN. CoDE ANN. § 46.04 (Vernon 1994).
56. See Mason at 641. In her concurring opinion, Judge Keller emphasized that review
of the legislative history was not necessary and that the statute clearly delineated the ele-
ments of the offense with which the defendant was charged. These elements were (1) the
defendant was a felon and (2) the defendant possessed a firearm outside his home. See id.
at 642.
57. In her concurring opinion, Judge Keller emphasized that review of the legislative
history was not necessary, that the statue clearly delineated the elements of the offense
with which the defendant was charged were (1) the defendant was a felon and (2) the
defendant possessed a firearm outside his home.
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convictions arose from the same incident 58 and, therefore, the defen-
dant's punishment was unfairly enhanced for a single prior illegal act.
The court observed that there were three grades of the offense of driv-
ing while intoxicated. The first grade encompassed a first offender and
the offense was a Class B misdemeanor. 59 In the second grade, if the
State could prove one prior conviction relating to the operation of a mo-
tor vehicle while intoxicated, the driving while intoxicated offense be-
came a Class A misdemeanor. 60 However, if the State could prove that
the defendant had previously been convicted twice of an offense relating
to operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, the driving while intoxi-
cated offense became a third offense, a felony of the third degree.
61
Thus, the prior intoxication related offenses were "elements of the of-
fense of driving while intoxicated. '62 Proof thereof is admitted during
the guilt innocence stage of the trial, in contrast to prior felony convic-
tions, which are introduced under the enhancement provisions of Texas
Penal Code section 12.42(d). 63 The prior intoxication-related convictions
served the purpose of only enhancing the offense in section 49.09(b),
whereas prior convictions used pursuant to section 12.42(d) served the
sole purpose of enhancing punishment. The statute in question, section
49.09(b), did not require that the convictions had to occur in a specified
order or that they needed to arise from separate transactions. 64
H. NOTICE OF EXTRANEOUS OFFENSES
In Simpson v. State,65 the defendant was convicted of indecency with a
child. At trial, the State introduced the defendant's prior offenses against
the complainant 66 without objection. On appeal, the defendant con-
tended that article 38.37 was not in effect when the indictment was re-
turned and he did not receive notice under rule of evidence 404(b). The
Court of Criminal Appeals first determined that the defendant was guilty
of procedural default.67 Second, the defendant did not request notice in a
self-executing document but rather styled his "request" as a motion ad-
dressed to the trial court. The court held that appellant's document was
not a self-executing request, thus it did not trigger the notice require-
ments under rule 404(b).68 Further, because he did not obtain a ruling on
58. The facts relating to the prior convictions showed that on December 4, 1989 the
defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter as a result of killing two persons
while operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. In one conviction punishment was set at
imprisonment and then the other at probation which was subsequently revoked and the
defendant imprisoned.
59. See Gibson, 995 S.W.2d at 695.
60. See id.
61. Id. at 697.
62. Id. at 697.
63. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 12.42d (Vernon 2000).
64. See Gibson, 995 S.W.2d at 696-97.
65. 991 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
66. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.37 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
67. See Simpson, 991 S.W.2d at 800.
68. See id. at 801.
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his motion, he waived this error.69
A year before his trial, the defendant in Mitchell v. State70 filed a mo-
tion asking the trial court to order the State to provide notice of extrane-
ous offenses pursuant to article 37.07. 71 The motion also asked the State
to provide certification of intent to comply or not comply within thirty
days of the date of the filing of the motion. On the day voir dire began,
the court granted the motion and the State gave notice of the extraneous
offenses but overruled the defendant's objection that the notice was not
timely. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the motion was also a
request to the State to provide notice of the extraneous offenses. The
Court of Criminal Appeals held that this was a motion for discovery ad-
dressed to the trial court.72 The court reaffirmed its holding in Simpson73
that motions for discovery addressed to the trial court are not effective
until the trial court rules on them.74
I. MOTION TO Dismiss
In State v. Munoz, 75 the Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed the appli-
cation of Barker v. Wingo76 to a defendant's federal constitutional right
to a speedy trial.77 In Munoz, the trial court granted the defendant's mo-
tion to dismiss the indictment; the court of appeals affirmed. The court of
criminal appeals reversed and ordered reinstatement of the indictment. 78
In making its decision, the court considered the following facts. First,
the length of delay from the defendant's arrest to his speedy trial hearing
was seventeen months, which is sufficiently long to trigger a speedy trial
analysis. Second, the delay was due to ongoing, good-faith plea negotia-
69. See id. at 800-01.
70. 982 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en bane).
71. Section 3(g) of article 37.07 addresses the admissibility of extraneous offense evi-
dence at the punishment phase of trial:
On timely request of the defendant, notice of intent to introduce evidence
under this article shall be given in the same manner required by Rule 404(b),
Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence .... The requirement under this subsec-
tion that the attorney representing the state give notice applies only if the
defendant makes a timely request to the attorney representing the state for
the notice.
TEx. COoE CRIM. PROc. ANN. art. 37.07 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
72. Mitchell, 982 S.W.2d at 427.
73. See Simpson v. State, supra notes 42; see also supra text accompanying notes 42-45.
74. See Mitchell, 982 S.W.2d at 427. The Court also stated "when a document seeks
trial court action, it cannot also serve as a request for notice triggering the State's duty
under Article 37.07, section 3(g). To hold otherwise would encourage gamesmanship. The
opposite rule could encourage defendants to bury requests in voluminous motions, hoping
the State would either overlook it or believe the request to be contingent on a court or-
der." Id,
75. 991 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (en banc).
76. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
77. Courts analyze speedy trial claims on an ad hoc basis by weighing and then balanc-
ing the four Barker factors: length of delay, reason for the delay, assertion of right to a
speedy trial, and prejudice suffered from the delay.
78. See Munoz, 991 S.W.2d at 830.
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tions. 79 Third, although the defendant signed a waiver of arraignment
form, which contained a pro forma request for a trial date and motion to
sever and also requested three separate jury trials, these actions could not
be considered assertions of the right to a speedy trial. Finally, the Court
rejected the defendant's argument that his case was prejudiced by a sev-
enteen-month delay.80 The three interests the court considered are (1)
preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration, (2) minimizing the accused's
anxiety, and (3) limiting the possibility that the defense will be im-
paired. 81 "[The defendant]'s bare 'assertion of dimming memories' does
not constitute 'some showing' of an impairment to the defense ... Barker
requires a defendant to show that 'lapses of memory' are in some way
'significant to the outcome' of the case."'8 2
J. IMMUNITY
In Graham v. State,83 the defendant's neighbors observed some men
carry a body, rolled up in a rug, out of the defendant's house. The neigh-
bors called the Harbin County sheriff's department When the sheriff ar-
rived, the defendant refused to give a statement unless she received
immunity from prosecution. When the Sheriff gave her a written guaran-
tee that she would not be prosecuted, she gave a statement.
The body was found in Jefferson County, and the defendant was in-
dicted in Jefferson County for aggravated kidnapping. The defendant as-
serted her immunity agreement with the Harbin County Sheriff as a plea
in bar to her prosecution and filed a motion to suppress asserting that her
written statement was a result of the immunity agreement. The Court of
Criminal Appeals stated that the power to grant immunity is statutory,
not constitutional.8 4 Transactional immunity in Texas is a promise by the
prosecutor to dismiss the case which requires the approval of the trial
court as does a grant of transactional immunity.8 5 Since the defendant's
immunity agreement was not approved by the trial court, it was not en-
forceable as against either county prosecutor.86
K. BRADY
In Little v. State,87 during the defendant's trial for driving while intoxi-
79. "Delay caused by good faith plea negotiations is not the result of negligence or a
'deliberate attempt to delay the trial.' [D]elay caused by good faith plea negotiations is a
valid reason for the delay and should not be weighed against the prosecution." Id. at 824.
80. See id. at 829-30.
81. See id. at 826.
82. See id. at 829. The court concluded there was no 'excessive' delay, there was a
valid reason for the delay for which the defendant was in part responsible, he did not assert
his right to a speedy trial, and any prejudice was minimal. The government did not violate
the defendant's right to a speedy trial. See id. at 829-30.
83. 994 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
84. See id. at 653.
85. See id. at 654.
86. See id. at 656.
87. 991 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
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cated, a chemist testified that the defendant's blood alcohol concentra-
tion was 0.13. After this testimony, but before cross-examination, the
State informed the defendant's attorney that the chemist had lost the
graph upon which his testimony was based. The court of appeals held the
trial court should have granted the defendant's motion for new trial be-
cause the trial court "may" have found the witness's testimony was inad-
missible without the graph, which would have changed the outcome of
the trial.88 The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding that the fact
that the trial court "may" have found the witness's testimony was inad-
missible was not sufficient; to reverse, the appeals court must have found
"a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense earlier, the result of the proceeding would have been different. '89
L. JUVENILE'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Hidalgo v. State90 involved a juvenile defendant who was tried and con-
victed as an adult for attempted capital murder and convicted after a jury
trial. The juvenile's appointed attorney was not notified of his psycholog-
ical examination, conducted pursuant to section 54.02(d) of the Juvenile
Justice Code, 91 until after the examination occurred. The defendant chal-
lenged the use of the report against him at the juvenile transfer hearing,
claiming the failure to notify his attorney prior to his examination vio-
lated his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel.
The Court of Criminal Appeals did not consider that the psychological
examination itself constituted a critical stage triggering Sixth Amendment
protection. Although the juvenile is entitled to the assistance of counsel
at his transfer hearing, the abuses the Sixth Amendment was designed to
protect against are not present in the psychological examination. Fur-
ther, the juvenile may challenge his examination in the transfer hearing.
M. GUILTY PLEAS, ADMONISHMENTS
The Court of Criminal Appeals held that a trial court satisfies a plea
agreement which sets a ceiling on punishment, when the assessed punish-
ment is deferred adjudication probation within the ceiling. 92 If the trial
court later adjudicates guilt due to a violation of the conditions, it may
impose a higher sentence because it has satisfied the bargain by its previ-
ous assessment of deferred adjudication probation. In two cases, defend-
ants Ditto and Ervin, pursuant to nearly identical plea bargains, agreed to
plead guilty in exchange for the State's recommendation that punishment
not exceed ten years confinement. Both defendants also filed applica-
tions for probation. In Ditto's plea bargain, the State expressly declined
88. See Little v. State, 971 S.W.2d 729, 731 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1998), rev'd, 991
S.W.2d 864 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
89. Little, 991 S.W.2d at 867.
90. 983 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
91. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02(d) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
92. See Ditto v. State, 988 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
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to make a recommendation on the defendant's application for probation
and/or deferred adjudication and left the decision to the court. In Ervin's
plea bargain, nothing was said about probation. The judge in each case
imposed ten years of deferred adjudication probation, warning that a sen-
tence of up to the maximum of twenty years could be imposed upon vio-
lation of the terms of the deferred adjudication probation. In each case,
the defendant violated the terms of his probation, the State moved to
adjudicate guilt, and the judge imposed a twenty year sentence. In each
case, the court of appeals held the trial judge violated the plea agreement
by imposing the twenty year sentence.
The Court of Criminal Appeals determined that when the trial courts
sentenced the defendants to ten years deferred adjudication, the defend-
ants were sentenced within the terms of their plea bargains. When they
violated the deferred adjudication probations, the trial courts had no fur-
ther obligation to comply with the plea bargains because the bargains had
already been completed and satisfied.
The court of appeals misread article 42.12, section 5(b) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure when it interpreted that section to permit the defend-
ants to withdraw their pleas. The court of appeals analyzed that provision
as beginning "[W]hen a defendant's deferred adjudication probation is re-
voked, all proceedings, including assessment of punishment, pronounce-
ment of sentence, granting of community supervision, and defendant's
appeal continue as if the adjudication of guilt had not been deferred. 93
The statute actually reads, "After an adjudication of guilt, all proceedings,
... continue as if the adjudication of guilt had not been deferred. '94 The
correct wording means that only after guilt has been adjudicated do pro-
ceedings continue as if there had been no deferred adjudication. That
statute lends no authority for the proposition that the defendants were in
a position to withdraw their pleas after their deferred adjudication com-
munity services were revoked.
During the past year, the Court of Criminal Appeals also considered
whether a defendant who is not a United States citizen has a constitu-
tional right to be admonished of the immigration consequences of a mis-
demeanor guilty plea and whether the plea is rendered involuntary by
lack of admonishments about possible immigration consequences. 95 The
Legislature required trial courts to admonish persons pleading guilty of
felonies after June 13, 1985 that their plea might result in deportation, but
did not require such warnings for those pleading guilty to misdemean-
ors.96 The court distinguished between direct and collateral conse-
quences of guilty pleas. 97 A guilty plea is voluntary if the defendant was
93. Id. at 93 (quoting Ervin, 955 S.W.2d at 419) (emphasis added).
94. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. Art. 42.12 § 5(b) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
95. See State v. Jimenez, 987 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
96. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
97. A consequence is "direct" where it is "definite, immediate and largely automatic."
United States v. Kikuyama, 109 F.2d 536, 537 (9th Cir. 1997). A consequence is "collat-
eral" where "it lies within the discretion of the court whether to impose it," or where "its
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made aware of the direct consequences of the plea.98 It is not involuntary
by lack of admonishment about a collateral consequence. Deportation is
a collateral, not a direct, consequence of a guilty plea.99 Although the
better practice might be to admonish all defendants as to possible depor-
tation consequences, such an admonition is not constitutionally
required.100
In Carranza v. State,10 1 the Court held that the trial court's failure to
admonish an illegal alien of the consequences of a guilty plea on his im-
migration status was reversible error. The defendant was in the United
States on an expired green card. He pleaded guilty to involuntary man-
slaughter and the trial court included a deadly weapon finding in the
judgment. The trial court admonished the defendant as to the range of
punishment, but did not admonish him orally or in writing that he could
be deported if he pled guilty. On appeal, the State argued that by advis-
ing the defendant the range of punishment for his offense, the trial court
substantially complied with article 26.13.102 The Court of Criminal Ap-
peals disagreed: "[T]o claim that a court is in substantial compliance with
26.13, even though a particular admonishment was never given, would be
a legal fiction."' 10 3 However, lacking substantial compliance does not end
the inquiry; failure to substantially admonish under article 26.13(a)(4)
was subject to harmless error analysis under Rule of Appellate Procedure
44.2.104
The Court of Criminal Appeals provided guidelines for applying Rule
44.2.105 First, determine whether the failure to substantially comply
under 26.13 is an error of constitutional magnitude or affects a substantial
right. 106 In this case the court determined the trial court's failure to ad-
monish the defendant was not a constitutional error. 10 7 Next, determine
imposition is controlled by an agency which operates beyond the direct authority of the
trial judge." Id.
98. See Jimenez, 987 S.W.2d at 888.
99. See id. at 888-89.
100. See Jimenez, 987 S.W.2d at 889.
101. 980 S.W.2d 653 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
102. According to this article 26.13:
(a) Prior to accepting a plea of guilty or a plea of nolo contendere, the court
shall admonish the defendant of:
(1) the range of punishment attached to the offense;
(4) the fact that if the defendant is not a citizen of the United States of
America, a plea of guilty or nolo contendere for the offense charged may
result in deportation, the exclusion from admission to this country, or the
denial of naturalization under federal law.
(b) In admonishing the defendant as herein provided, substantial compli-
ance by the court is sufficient, unless the defendant affirmatively shows that
he was not aware of the consequences of his plea and that he was misled or
harmed by the admonishment of the court.
TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
103. Carranza, 980 S.W.2d at 655.
104. See id. at 656.
105. See id. at 656-68.
106. See id. at 656.
107. See id.
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whether the failure affected a substantial right. 10 8 When there has been
no substantial compliance, the defendant has to show only that he was
not aware of the consequences of his plea and was misled or harmed by
the court's admonishment.' 0 9 The State argued that defendant was not
harmed by the trial court's failure to admonish him because, as an illegal
alien, he was already subject to deportation. However, the court deter-
mined that an alien who is convicted of a criminal offense is clearly at a
greater disadvantage if subject to deportation as a criminal deportee than
an alien who possesses expired immigration documents.110 The court
held that defendant was harmed by the failure to admonish and affirmed
the court of appeals.11
In Martinez v. State,112 the defendant pled guilty to burglary of a vehi-
cle pursuant to a plea bargain. The trial court deferred a finding of guilty
and placed him on community supervision for five years. When the State
filed a second motion to revoke, the trial court found that the defendant
had violated the terms of his community supervision, found him guilty,
and assessed punishment at ten years imprisonment. The range of pun-
ishment for the defendant's third degree felony offense was two to ten
years. He had signed a form containing written admonishments when he
pled guilty that contained blanks for the appropriate minimum and maxi-
mum length of imprisonment. The form correctly showed two and ten
years. However the form also contained language showing the possibility
of a life sentence, language only applicable for a first degree felony of-
fense, and the life sentence language was not stricken on the form the
defendant signed. The trial court orally inquired whether the defendant
was aware of the applicable range of punishment, but did not reiterate
the actual range he faced. The court held that although the trial court
delivered an incorrect admonishment regarding the range of punishment,
the actual sentence fell within both the actual and misstated maximum.' 1 3
Therefore, the trial court substantially complied with the admonishments
required.
In Aguirre-Mata v. State,114 the trial court wholly failed to admonish
the defendant as to the range of punishment before accepting his guilty
plea to possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. The
court of appeals reversed and remanded the case because there was no
affirmative showing the defendant had full knowledge of the range of
punishment; therefore holding that failure to admonish was constitutional
error under Rule 44.2(a) of Appellate Procedure.' 1 5 Reversing the court
108. See id. at 657-58.
109. See id. at 658.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. 981 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
113. See id. at 197.
114. 992 S.W.2d 495 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
115. Under the Rules of Procedure, "[i]f the appellate record in a criminal case reveals
constitutional error that is subject to a harmless error review, the court of appeals must
reverse a judgment of conviction or punishment unless the court determines beyond a rea-
2000]
SMU LAW REVIEW
of appeals, the Court of Criminal Appeals held the defendant did not
allege his guilty plea was involuntary as a result of the trial court's failure
to admonish him in accordance with article 26.13(a)(1). 116 Therefore,
consistent with Carranza, the error was subject to a harm analysis under
Rule 44.2(b) because it is statutory, not constitutional.' 17
N. VOIR DIRE
A jury found the defendant guilty of capital murder and the trial court
sentenced him to death in Jones v. State.' 8 The defendant contended the
trial court erred in granting the State's challenge of a venire member for
cause. The trial court granted the State's challenge to the venire person
under the theory that she would give accomplice witnesses less credibility
than other witnesses. The Court clarified its holding in Hernandez," 9
where a venire member was found challengeable for cause if the venire
member could not impartially judge a witness's credibility.120 Hernandez
must not be interpreted to mean that a venire person is challengeable for
cause simply because he would be more skeptical of a certain category of
witness than of witnesses generally. Litigants are entitled to jurors with
no extreme or absolute positions on the credibility of a category of wit-
ness. Jurors need not be completely impartial or free of skepticism to-
ward any category of witness. A venire person is not challengeable for
cause simply because he is more skeptical of a certain category of witness
than of witnesses generally. "Complete impartiality cannot be realized as
long as human beings are called upon to be jurors."1121 Thus, the trial
court applied the wrong legal standard, and the venire person was not
challengeable.122
In its harm analysis, the court noted that the constitutional right to trial
by an impartial jury is not violated by every error in the selection of a
jury. 123 The rejection of allegedly unqualified persons for insufficient
cause does not often deprive the defendant of an impartial jury. 124 Only
in very limited cases, when a juror is erroneously excused because of a
general opposition to the death penalty, does the exclusion of a juror by
an unintentional mistake amount to a constitutional violation.I25The
court saw no constitutional dimension to the error. In examining whether
the error affected substantial right, the court reasoned that a defendant
sonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the conviction or punishment." TEX. R.
APP. P. 44.2(a).
116. See Aguirre-Mata, 992 S.W.2d at 499; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art
26.13(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2000). See supra note 34.
117. See Aguirre-Mata, 992 S.W.2d at 499.
118. 982 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
119. 563 S.W.2d 947, 950 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
120. See Jones, 982 S.W.2d at 389.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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has no right that any particular person serve on his jury. The defendant's
only substantial right is that the jurors who do serve be qualified. The
,court overruled Peyton v. State,126 in which it held that a conviction will
be reversed when a juror was erroneously excused and the State used all
its peremptory challenges. "[T]he erroneous excusing of a venire member
will call for reversal only if the record shows that the error deprived the
defendant of a lawfully constituted jury."1 27
During a voir dire examination before an aggravated robbery trial, the
State explained the law of parties to the prospective jurors and asked
them whether if the evidence warranted it, they could find a defendant
guilty of aggravated robbery as a party. 128 Later, defense counsel asked
them whether they could consider assessing the minimum legal punish-
ment for a defendant found guilty of aggravated robbery as a principal.
Two prospective jurors stated unequivocally that they could not. The trial
court denied the defense's challenges for cause. The Court stated that
both the defendant and the State have the right to have jurors who be-
lieve in the full range of punishment.12 9 Prospective jurors must be able
to accept that, for the offense in question, the minimum and maximum
legal punishment will be appropriate in some circumstances. 130 Further-
more, they must be able to keep an open mind with respect to punish-
ment regardless of whether the defendant is guilty as a principal or as a
party.' 3 ' The court concluded the trial court abused its discretion in de-
nying the defendant's challenge of the two jurors for cause and remanded
the case to the court of appeals for a harm analysis.
In Gonzales v. State,132 a case regarding aggravated assault and posses-
sion of a deadly weapon in a penal institution, the defense counsel at-
tempted to query the prospective jurors about the specific defense of
necessity. The trial court refused, over counsel's objection, to allow this
line of questioning, permitting only general questions on the broader is-
sue of self-defense. The court of appeals concluded the trial court abused
its discretion and held this error was not subject to harm analysis.' 33 The
Court of Criminal Appeals stated that Cain v. State,'34 not Nunfio v.
State, now determines this issue.135 Cain contains a broad mandate that
"except for certain federal constitutional errors labeled by the United
States Supreme Court as 'structural,' no error ... is categorically immune
126. 572 S.W.2d 677, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
127. Jones, 982 S.W.2d at 394.
128. See Johnson v. State, 982 S.W.2d 403 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
129. See id. at 405.
130. See id. at 406.
131. See id.
132. 994 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
133. The court of appeals relied on Nunfio v. State, 808 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. Crim. App.
1991), where the Court of Criminal Appeals held "error in the denial of a proper question
that prevents the intelligent exercise of one's preemptory challenges constitutes an abuse
of discretion and is not subject to a harm analysis." Id. at 485.
134. 947 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
135. See Gonzales, 994 S.W.2d at 171.
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[from] a harmless error analysis. ' 136 Erroneously restricting proper ques-
tions during voir dire has not been held to be structural error of a federal
constitutional nature. 137 Therefore, the appellate court was required to
conduct a harm analysis before reversing the conviction.
II. TRIAL
A. OPENING STATEMENT
In Tucker v. State,138 after the state rested its case in chief, the defen-
dant's counsel said, "At this time the defense would like to make an
opening statement." The court denied the request. Counsel said, "Okay.
In that case we will call [our first witness]." Relying on Dunn v. State,139
the court of appeals concluded that the defendant failed to preserve his
complaint. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, stating that its hold-
ing in Dunn was limited to its facts.' 40 In Tucker, unlike Dunn, there was
a specific request and an adverse ruling. 141
B. EVIDENCE
In Mozon v. State,142 a high school girl threw a cup of gasoline on an-
other student while they sat in the high school cafeteria and lit it with a
piece of paper, injuring him. The defendant testified that the complain-
ant had repeatedly threatened her, and she believed he meant to injure
her as soon as he finished eating. The defendant sought to testify that she
knew at the time of the incident of three prior violent incidents involving
the complainant. She maintained this testimony went to the reasonable-
ness of her belief that the complainant was about to harm her when she
threw the gasoline on him. The trial court ruled the evidence relevant to
her claim of self-defense but inadmissible under Texas Rule of Evidence
403.1 43 The defendant argued that the Rule 403 balancing test did not
apply to the evidence because it supported her self-defense claim. The
Court determined that the evidence was admissible under Rule 404(b) 144
to show that the defendant reasonably believed she was in danger and the
136. Id.
137. See Gonzales, 994 S.W.2d at 171.
138. 990 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
139. 819 S.W.2d 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
140. In Dunn, a capital murder defendant represented himself. The trial began shortly
after a statutory amendment allowed a defendant the choice of making an opening state-
ment immediately after the State's opening statement, rather than waiting until after the
State rested its case-in-chief. After the State made its opening statement, Dunn asked,
"Before the State's witness takes the stand, may I make a brief statement to the jury?"
When the court told Dunn, "You will be able to do that when it comes your time to put on
your evidence," Dunn said, "Thank you." The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded
Dunn's interchange was not sufficiently specific to inform the trial court of the basis of the
objection and give it the opportunity to cure the problem.
141. Moreover, the Court did not interpret the Tucker response "Okay" to mean the
defendant acquiesced to the trial court's ruling.
142. 991 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
143. TEX. R. Evil). 403.
144. TEX. R. Evi3. 404(b).
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force she used against the complainant was immediately necessary to pro-
tect herself.145 Regardless, all relevant evidence is subject to the Rule
403 balancing test, with no exception for evidence relevant to a defensive
theory. 146 The court of appeals was cited for failing to follow the relevant
403 criteria set out in Montgomery v. State'47 in that the court of appeals
did not discuss the prejudice that the evidence would cause the State.
The Court remanded, instructing the court to address the evidence's
prejudice to the State.
In Butterfield v. State,148 a sexual assault case, the State sought custody
of the defendant' stepdaughter who was missing. At a hearing to deter-
mine her whereabouts, Butterfield was asked questions about the missing
stepdaughter and her mother. Butterfield invoked his Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, but the judge ordered him to respond
to the questions. The State subsequently indicted Butterfield for perjury
on the basis of the defendant's responses. The trial court granted the
defendant's motion to suppress the statements in a subsequent perjury
trial based on the privilege against self-incrimination. The State ap-
pealed. The court of appeals affirmed the Court of Criminal Appeals
held that the trial court violated Butterfield's Fifth Amendment rights by
compelling him to answer the questions without granting him immunity.
However, the court stressed that the Fifth Amendment gives no protec-
tion for perjury. and the statements could be admitted into evidence at
his perjury trial.
In Howland v. State,149 the defendant was convicted of two aggravated
sexual assaults and two acts of indecency with a child. The court re-
viewed the case to resolve a split among courts of appeals regarding ap-
plicability of article 38.37 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 150 to cases
145. See Mozon, 991 S.W.2d at 846.
146. See id.
147. "The reviewing court must look at the proponent's need for the evidence in addi-
tion to determining the relevance of the evidence." The relevant criteria in determining
whether the prejudice of an extraneous offense outweighs its probative value include: (1)
how compellingly the extraneous offense evidence serves to make a fact of consequence
more or less probable; (2) the potential the other offense evidence has to impress the jury
"in some irrational but nevertheless indelible way;" (3) the time the proponent will need to
develop the evidence, during which the jury will be distracted from consideration of the
indicted offense; (4) the force of the proponent's need for this evidence to prove a fact of
consequence, i.e., does the proponent have other probative evidence available to him to
help establish this fact; and (5) is this fact related to an issue in dispute. Santellan v. State,
939 S.W.2d 155, 169 (Tex.Crim.App.1997) (citing Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 389-90).
148. 992 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
149. 990 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
150. Article 38.37 applied to prosecutions of defendants for sexual and assaultive of-
fenses committed against a child under 17 years of age:
Sec. 2. Notwithstanding Rules 404 and 405, Texas Rules of Criminal Evi-
dence, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts committed by the defendant
against the child who is the victim of the alleged offense shall be admitted for
its bearing on relevant matters, including:
(1) the state of mind of the defendant and the child; and




where the indictment was returned before the statute's effective date of
September 1, 1995. The defendant argued that because he was indicted
before the effective date of article 38.37, the article did not apply to any
part of his prosecution, even though his trial began after its effective date.
The court held that article 38.37 is applicable to any one of many isolated
proceedings within a prosecution, so long as the proceeding at issue oc-
curred after September 1, 1995.
In Maestas v, State,151 the defendant was arrested for aggravated as-
sault with a deadly weapon. During the arrest, police advised her she was
under arrest and read her the Miranda warnings. The defendant was
"Mirandized" again when they arrived at the police station an hour later.
The defendant indicated she understood, signed a waiver, and stated she
did not want to talk to police. The next morning, the defendant signed
another waiver form and reiterated that she did not want to talk to police.
That evening, her arresting officer brought her to his office, Mirandized
her again, and asked her some questions. She then indicated she wanted
to talk to police. The officer Mirandized her again, and she signed a
statement that she understood her rights. The defendant then gave a
statement. The trial court overruled her motion to suppress the state-
ment and admitted the statement at trial.
The Court applied the Mosley z52 factors to determine whether the po-
lice "scrupulously honored" the defendant's "right to cut off question-
ing."'153 Reviewing the case de novo, 154 the court concluded that the
police "scrupulously honored" the defendant's right to remain silent. 55
In Bingham v. State, the Court reviewed a statement against interest
exception to the hearsay rule.15 6 The defendant's home was destroyed by
fire. During the police investigation, his wife admitted to the investigat-
ing officer that she and her husband planned the fire to collect insurance
money, and that her husband lit the fire himself. At the defendant's ar-
son trial, the trial court overruled the defendant's hearsay objection to
the officer's testimony about his wife's comments. The Court noted that
nowhere in Rule 803(24)157 does it limit the exception to cases in which
Sec. 3. On timely request by the defendant, the state shall give the defendant
notice of the state's intent to introduce in the case in chief evidence de-
scribed by Section 2 in the same manner as the state is required to give notice
under Rule 404(b), Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence.
Sec. 4. This article does not limit the admissibility of evidence of extraneous
crimes, wrongs, or acts under any other applicable law.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.37 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
151. 987 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
152. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96.
153. (1) whether the suspect was informed of his right to remain silent prior to the
initial questioning; (2) whether the suspect was informed of his right to remain silent prior
to the subsequent questioning; (3) the length of time between initial questioning an subse-
quent questioning; (4) whether the subsequent questioning focused on a different crime;
and (5) whether police honored the suspect's initial invocation of the right to remain silent.
154. See Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
155. See Maestas, 987 S.W.2d at 61-64.
156. Bingham v. State, 987 S.W.2d 54 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
157. TEX. R. EVID. 803(24).
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the defendant is the declarant, and held such statements are admissible,
regardless of whether the criminal defendant is the declarant of the
statement.158
The defendant in Marx159 was indicted for aggravated sexual assault of
a thirteen year old child. Evidence showed that complainant and a six
year old witness were afraid of testifying in the defendant's presence and
would suffer emotionally and perhaps physically if they were forced to do
so. Over the defendant's objections, the trial court permitted the two
girls to testify via two-way closed circuit television outside the defen-
dant's presence. The Court of Criminal Appeals stated that the Confron-
tation Clause's preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial must
occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessi-
ties of the case. The trial court acted in accordance with Maryland v.
Craig160 in finding that the device was necessary to protect both children
from the trauma of having to testify in the defendant's physical presence,
and the record supported that fact finding. In response to the defendant's
complaint that admitting the closed circuit television testimony impaired
his presumption of innocence, the court suggested that the jury would
probably interpret the closed circuit testimony as protecting children
from the intimidating courtroom environment rather than being neces-
sary because of the defendant's guilt. Finally, the court reviewed whether
the trial court violated article 38.071 of the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure 161 because the complainant was thirteen years old at the time of the
offense and at trial.1 62 The court determined that the legislature did not
intend to exclude the use of special testimonial procedures in circum-
stances not specified in section one, if the procedures are constitutional.
Therefore, article 38.071 did not prohibit the use of the closed circuit tele-
vision testimony of the thirteen year old.
158. Admissibility of a statement against interest under rule 803(24) requires a two-step
inquiry: determination whether the statement tends to expose the declarant to criminal
liability and determination of whether there are corroborating circumstances to clearly in-
dicate the trustworthiness of the statement. In reversing the trial court, the court of ap-
peals did not consider all of the "corroborative circumstances" evidence available to the
trial court for considering the trustworthiness of the statement, but only considered the
circumstances at the time the wife made her statement to the officer. Citing Davis v. State,
872 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). the court stated that all evidence must be
considered.
159. Marx v. State, 987 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
160. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
161. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
162. Article 38.071 provides that, in certain circumstances, a child witness's testimony
may be taken via videotape or closed circuit television, outside the defendant's presence:
This article applies only to a proceeding in the prosecution of an offense
defined by any of the following sections of the Penal Code [including aggra-
vated sexual assault of a child] if the offense is alleged to have been commit-
ted against a child 12 years of age or younger and if the trial court finds that
the child is unavailable to testify at the trial of the offense, and applies only




In Giesberg v. State,163 a murder prosecution, several witnesses testified
that they saw the defendant standing over the victim's body. The defen-
dant presented evidence that he was elsewhere at the time of the murder.
At the close of the evidence, the trial court denied the defendant's re-
quest for a jury instruction on alibi.
The Court of Criminal Appeals that the defendant was not entitled to
an instruction on alibi because this theory "constitutes no more than a
negation of an essential element of the State's case; specifically, that [the
defendant] committed the offense at the alleged time and location. '164
The Court, in Wright v. State,165 recently recognized that a defense to
prosecution for possession of a controlled substance is available if the
controlled substance was (1) obtained abroad for personal individual use
pursuant to a valid foreign prescription from a physician permitted in his
jurisdiction to dispense controlled substances and (2) the substance was
brought into this country in accordance with federal law. However, be-
cause the jury was not instructed on this defense, the court held the court
of appeals improperly assumed the role of a fact-finder by determining
the defense was established by the evidence.
In Floyd v. State,166 the defendant was indicted for violations of the
Texas Securities Act. The defendant entered into a plea bargain agree-
ment in which he agreed to plead nolo contendere in exchange for a ten-
year probated sentence and a $300 fine. The trial court followed the plea
bargain, deferred adjudication of the defendant's guilt, and assessed the
agreed sentence. In a motion for new trial, the defendant complained for
the first time that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction
because the prosecution was barred by the statute of limitations. Follow-
ing Lemell v. State167 the court of appeals concluded the prosecution was
barred because limitations had run.' 68 The Court of Criminal Appeals
noted that it had overruled Lemell in Proctor v. State 69 which held that
a statute of limitations claim is a defense which a defendant will forfeit if
he does not assert it at or before the guilt or innocence phase of trial. 170
As the defendant failed to raise this defense before trial or during the
presentation of evidence on his nolo contendere pleas, he forfeited it
under Proctor.'7'
163. 984 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en bane).
164. The court further noted that an instruction on the issue of alibi would also consti-
tute an improper comment on the weight of the evidence by drawing unwarranted atten-
tion to evidence that the defendant was at another place when the crime was committed.
In addition, the legislature has not made alibi a defense or an affirmative defense.
165. 981 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc).
166. 983 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc).
167. 915 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en banc).
168. See Floyd v. State, 914 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1996, pet. granted).
169. 967 S.W.2d 840 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc).
170. Id. at 844.
171. Floyd, 983 S.W.2d at 274.
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In Jones v. State,172 a robbery prosecution, the State's evidence showed
the defendant fought with several loss prevention officers as he at-
tempted to leave a grocery store without paying. Jones denied attempt-
ing to steal or assaulting the loss prevention officers but on cross-
examination, the defendant stated that he "did self defense." At the
close of the evidence, the trial court denied the defense request that the
jury be instructed on the lesser-included offenses of misdemeanor assault
and misdemeanor theft. He asserted these offenses were raised by his
testimony that he did not commit robbery. On appeal, the court con-
cluded that the evidence that the defendant was seen taking several items
combined with the defendant's testimony that he did not commit an as-
sault raised the issue of misdemeanor theft.173 Likewise, the State's evi-
dence that the defendant assaulted the loss prevention officers and the
defendant's testimony that he did not take any items from the store
raised the issue of misdemeanor assault. 174
The Court of Criminal Appeals held that if there is evidence within a
defendant's testimony that raises the lesser-included offense, it is not dis-
positive that this evidence does not fit in with the larger theme of the
defendant's testimony.1 75 The controlling question is whether there is
any evidence that raises the lesser-included offense, because the trier of
fact is always free to selectively believe all or part of the testimony prof-
fered by either side.
In Ochoa v. State,176 the Court of Criminal Appeals held that evidence
of a single act of sexual touching did not support convictions for both
aggravated sexual assault and indecency with a child. The evidence
showed the defendant committed only one offense against the complain-
ant on a particular date. Therefore, the trial court should have either (1)
required the State to elect which offense upon which it would proceed, or
(2) submitted the offense of indecency with a child as a lesser-included
offense of aggravated sexual assault.
In Barrera v. State,177 the Court considered the proper standard of re-
view when, in the absence of an objection, a jury charge includes an in-
struction on the law of self defense but fails to apply self defense in the
application paragraph. The trial court has no duty to sua sponte charge
the jury on unrequested defensive issues raised by the evidence. But by
including the instruction in the abstract portion of the charge, the trial
court signaled that the law of self defense applied in this case. Therefore,
172. 984 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc).
173. Jones v. State, 962 S.W.2d 96, 98 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet.
granted).
174. Id.
175. On petition for discretionary review, the State asserted the court of appeals erred
by combining parts of the State's evidence and combining it with parts of the defendant's
evidence to find the lesser-included offenses were raised. When the defendant's testimony
was taken as a whole, it indicated he committed no crime at all, and therefore his testimony
does not show that if he is indeed guilty, he is guilty only of the lesser-included offenses.
176. 982 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc).
177. 982 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
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by failing to apply self defense to the facts of the case, the trial court
committed charge error. The court further concluded that this error did
not implicate the defendant's federal constitutional rights because it was
only a technical violation of a state law rule. Thus, the error was subject
to the "egregious harm" analysis applicable to charge errors generally
when the defendant neither requested the charge or objected to the
charge given. 178
D. PUNISHMENT
In Dickens v. State,179 the court considered when the elements of an
aggregated offense occur for the purpose of determining the effective
date of an amended sentencing statute. The defendant committed forty-
four thefts pursuant to a continuing scheme between August 20, 1993 and
September 14, 1994. The aggregate amount stolen was $96,786.16. The
State charged the defendant with a single count of aggregated theft of
more than $20,000 but less than $100,000. The defendant pleaded guilty,
and the trial court assessed a twenty-year sentence and a $1000 fine. On
appeal, the defendant asserted the trial court erred in assessing a twenty-
year sentence because, effective September 1, 1994, the legislature re-
duced the maximum sentence for her offense from twenty years to ten
years; because some of her thefts were committed after September 1,
1994, the aggregated offense occurred after the effective date of the sen-
tencing statute and therefore her sentence exceeded the statutory maxi-
mum sentence allowed.
The court of criminal appeals noted that the amending legislation con-
tained a savings clause, which provided that an aggregated offense is
committed "on or before the effective date of this article if any element
of the offense is committed before the effective date.' 80 Under the ag-
gregation statute, multiple theft offenses may be combined into a single
offense. Each subsidiary theft is a component or element of the single
aggregated offense. Therefore, because the defendant committed some
elements, i.e., thefts, before the effective date of the amendment reducing
the maximum sentence, the trial court correctly applied the former law in
sentencing the defendant.
In Coffey v. State,181 the defendant pleaded guilty and was placed on
probation for five years and fined $750. The trial court subsequently re-
voked the defendant's probation and orally assessed a five-year sentence.
The written judgment, however, also included a $750 fine that the trial
court did not orally pronounce at the revocation hearing. The court of
appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment but reformed the sentence to
178. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.1.9 (Vernon 1981); Almanza v. State, 686
S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
179. 981 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc).
180. Id. at 188.
181. 979 S.W.2d 326 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc).
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delete the $750 fine because it was not orally pronounced. 18 2 The State
argued that the court of appeals erred in reforming the judgment to de-
lete the fine.
The Court of Criminal Appeals held that, when there is a variation
between the oral pronouncement of sentence and the written memoriali-
zation of sentence, the oral pronouncement controls. The court of ap-
peals erred in deleting the fine because the record showed that fine was
not probated. Because the $750 fine was imposed when punishment was
assessed at the original plea hearing, it was appropriately included in the
judgment revoking the defendant's probation.183
In Rogers v. State,184 the defendant was convicted of attempted capital
murder and sentenced to life in prison. During the punishment phase,
the State offered three penitentiary packets which contained the length of
the sentence assessed in each case. The defendant objected 185 and re-
quested that the sentences be redacted. The Court held that the sentences
assessed for prior convictions are relevant in the context of the jury's de-
cision on punishment because they help the jury tailor the sentence to the
particular defendant.18 6
In Yvanez v. State,187 the defendant pleaded guilty to four counts of
intoxication manslaughter and one count of intoxication assault, and the
jury assessed a forty-year sentence and a fine in each conviction for intox-
ication manslaughter and a ten-year sentence and a fine in the conviction
for intoxication assault. The trial court ordered the sentences to run con-
currently except for the sentence in the second count of intoxication man-
slaughter, which the trial court ordered to run consecutively. The court
of appeals affirmed the defendant's convictions, but determined sua
sponte that the trial court erred in ordering the sentence in the second
intoxication manslaughter case to run consecutively.
The Court of Criminal Appeals determined that the court of appeals
erred in concluding that no exception to the "concurrent sentences" rule
contained in section 3.03 of the Texas Penal Code applied in the instant
case. When the defendant committed his offenses, section 3.03 of the pe-
nal code provided that, if the accused is found guilty of more than one
offense arising out of the same criminal episode, the sentences may run
concurrently or consecutively if each sentence is for a conviction for in-
182. Coffey v. State, No. 05-96-00181-CR (Tex. App.-Dallas July 8, 1997) (not desig-
nated for publication).
183. Coffey v. State, 979 S.W.2d 326, 329 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc).
184. 991 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (en banc).
185. The length of the sentences was irrelevant and any probative value was substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
186. The court noted that article 37.07, section 3 of the code of criminal procedure also
governs the admissibility of evidence during the punishment stage of trial. This section
provides that evidence may be offered by the State and the defendant on any matter the
court deems relevant to sentencing, "including but not limited to the prior criminal record
of the defendant." TEX. CODE CRaM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07, § 3(a) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
187. 991 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (en banc).
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toxication manslaughter. 188 The court concluded that the defendant's
second count of intoxication manslaughter was within the exception cre-
ated by the legislature; therefore, the trial court acted within its discretion
in sentencing the defendant consecutively in any of the intoxication man-
slaughter cases. However, the trial court could not order sentence for the
intoxication manslaughter conviction to run consecutively to the convic-
tion for intoxication assault because intoxication assault is not encom-
passed by the statutory exception.
In Bell v. State,189 the defendant was convicted for retaliation commit-
ted against a jailer while the defendant was an inmate at the penitentiary
serving a sentence for burglary of a habitation. Under the authority of
article 42.08(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the trial court or-
dered the sentence in the retaliation case to run consecutively to the sen-
tence in the burglary case. Relying on Resanovich v. State'90 and Turner
v. State,191 the court of appeals held that the trial court erred in stacking
the sentences because there was no record evidence of the prior burglary
conviction and that the defendant was the person convicted.192
The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding that nothing in the
plain language of article 42.08(b) required such proof.193 In addition, the
court of appeals erred in reforming the trial court's judgment to delete
the cumulation order on the grounds that allowing the State a second
chance to present its proof of the prior burglary conviction would violate
the double jeopardy provisions of the state and federal constitutions in
view of the Monge v. California'94 holding that double jeopardy princi-
ples are generally not applicable to noncapital sentencing proceedings
was dispositive of this issue. Any case to the contrary was overruled.195
III. PROBATION REVOCATION: NOTICE OF APPEAL
In Rodriguez v. State'96 the defendant pled nolo contendere to volun-
tary manslaughter in 1982 and the trial court placed him on ten years
deferred adjudication. In 1988 the State moved to adjudicate on the basis
of probation violations. The defendant was arrested in 1996. In 1997, the
trial court adjudicated the defendant guilty of the offense and sentenced
him to twenty years confinement. The defendant appealed, claiming the
188. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 3.03(b) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
189. 994 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (en banc).
190. 906 S.W.2d 40, 42-43 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
191. 733 S.W.2d 218, 223 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
192. See Bell v. State, No. 14-96-00388-CR, slip op. at 3, 1999 WL 418766 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] July 23, 1998, pet. granted) (not designated for publication).
193. The reasons for requiring specificity in a cumulation order under article 42.08(a)
do not exist under article 42.08(b), which provides that cumulation is mandatory.
194. 524 U.S. 721 (1998).
195. See, e.g., Cooper v. State, 631 S.W.2d 508 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982); Ex parte Au-
gusta, 639 S.W.2d 481 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982); Carter v. State, 676 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1984); Washington v. State, 677 S.W.2d 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Ex parte Gonza-
les, 707 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Ex parte Quirke,710 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1986).
196. 992 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
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State failed to use due diligence in apprehending him and bringing him in
for a hearing. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of juris-
diction because the defendant filed a general notice of appeal. The Court
of Criminal Appeals agreed that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction
under Connolly v. State.197
IV. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
In Hernandez v. State,198 the Court of Criminal Appeals announced
that the Strickland'99 two-prong standard200 applies to ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claims at the punishment as well as the guilt/innocence
phase of trial. The court overruled Ex parte Duffy2° 1 as modified by Ex
parte Cruz.202
In Kober v. State,203 the defendant strangled the deceased while a wit-
ness was present. The witness gave police statements that she saw the
defendant commit the offense. The defendant's attorney related this in-
formation to the defendant who decided to plead nolo contendere and
hope to get deferred adjudication. The defendant did so and received
deferred adjudication. A year later, the trial court adjudicated him guilty.
In a motion for new trial, the defendant argued ineffective assistance of
counsel because his attorney did not interview the witness. At the hear-
ing, the defendant presented the witness's affidavit that she was high on
cocaine when she spoke to the police and that the police threatened her
to obtain her statement. The witness said in the affidavit that she did not
witness the murder and that she would not have testified if the defendant
had a trial because she feared retaliation. However, when called to tes-
tify at the hearing, the witness invoked her Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. The prosecutor testified he interviewed the
witness and she was not intimidated by the police. The defendant's attor-
ney stated that he assumed the witness was high on cocaine when witness-
ing the crime. The court of appeals reversed on the prejudice prong of
Strickland because "he [the defense attorney] might have discovered that
[the witness] might possibly have had a credibility problem because she
was under the influence of cocaine or that she was reluctant to testify
against appellant. °20 4
The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the court of appeals because
"might have discovered" the credibility problem and unwillingness to tes-
197. Id. at 484 (citing Connolly v. State, 983 S.W.2d 738, 741 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
198. 988 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)).
199. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
200. The two-prong Strickland test is (1) whether counsel's conduct was deficient and
(2) whether counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defendant; that is, whether, but
for the counsel's deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been dif-
ferent. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
201. 607 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
202. 739 S.W.2d 53 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
203. 988 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
204. Kober v. State, No. 14-95-00864-CR, slip op. at 8, 1997 WL 590783 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] September 25, 1997) (unpublished).
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tify is the wrong standard. 20 5 To satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland,
the defendant must show "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
[failure to discover these facts]" the defendant would not have pleaded
nolo contendere.20 6 The trial court determined the facts showed the de-
fendant's counsel knew of the witness's cocaine use and credibility
problems. Citing the Guzman standard, 20 7 the court stated the issue of
the witness's willingness to testify was a credibility issue for the trial court
and that the evidence supported a finding that the witness had not been
unwilling to testify. If the defendant and his counsel were aware of the
cocaine credibility issue from other sources, an interview with the witness
would have revealed nothing new affecting the defendant's decision to
plead nolo contendere. 20 8
In Ex parte Moody,209 the Court of Criminal Appeals held that defense
counsel's incorrect advice that after pleading to a State possession of-
fense, the defendant would be returned to federal custody to serve his
federal and state sentences concurrently, constituted ineffective assis-
tance of counsel. 210 In Moody, the defendant was arrested for possession
of a controlled substance. While on bond, he was also arrested for a fed-
eral offense, for which he was sentenced to a term in federal prison. Prior
to serving his federal sentence, the defendant was transferred to state dis-
trict court to resolve his possession case. The prosecutor offered a plea
bargain of fifteen years confinement. Defense counsel, after consulting
the defendant's federal public defender, repeatedly assured the defendant
that, after pleading guilty, he would be returned to federal custody to
serve both terms concurrently. Relying on this information, the defen-
dant opted to plead guilty. After being transferred to the Texas Depart-
ment of Criminal Justice and learning his federal sentence would not
begin until his release from state custody, the defendant contended his
plea was involuntary, due to ineffective assistance of counsel, because he
relied on his counsel's erroneous advice.
The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed. When assessing the defense
counsel's competence, the court holds counsel accountable for knowledge
of relevant legal matters that are neither novel nor unsettled.211 Whether
the defendant would serve his sentences concurrently or consecutively
was a matter of law and ascertainable. The court determined that the
counsel's mistake was not within the range of competence for a criminal
205. Kober, 988 S.W.2d at 233.
206. Id.
207. Appellate courts must "afford almost total deference" to a trial court's determina-
tion of the historical facts and of mixed questions of law and fact that "[turn] on an evalua-
tion of credibility and demeanor." Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App.
1997).
208. Meyers, J., joined by Holland, Price, and Johnson, JJ., concurred in the decision to
reverse the appeals court but would have remanded to the court of appeals to re-perform
the Strickland analysis instead of the Court of Criminal Appeals performing the analysis.
209. 991 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
210. Id. at 859.
211. Moody, 991 S.W.2d at 858, citing Exparte Welch, 981 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. Crim. App.
1998).
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attorney. Second, the court concluded the defendant showed a reasona-
ble probability that, but for his counsel's erroneous advice, he would not
have pled guilty. The court distinguished this case from a case in which a
defendant relies on erroneous parole eligibility information, which is
speculative by nature.212 The court set aside the judgment and remanded
the case.
In Young v. State,2 13 the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the de-
fense attorney's failure to request a jury instruction on necessity did not
deprive him of the effective assistance of counsel. 214 In Young, the defen-
dant did not present the defense of necessity at his attempted murder
trial. To raise necessity, a defendant must admit he committed the of-
fense, then offer necessity as a justification. 215 The defendant did not
admit to attempted murder, but rather argued he did not commit at-
tempted murder because he lacked the requisite intent and he did not
perform the actions the State alleged. Therefore, he was not entitled to a
jury instruction on the defense of necessity. Consequently, his counsel
was not deficient in failing to request an instruction.2 16
In Ex parte Patterson,21 7 the defendant was convicted of attempted cap-
ital murder. The Court of Criminal Appeals had remanded the defen-
dant's writ application for the trial court to determine whether his trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a prior conviction being
included in the enhancement paragraphs because the prior conviction was
void due to a fundamental defect. The trial court entered findings of fact
and conclusions of law, and found that the counsel's affidavit showed he
was not ineffective. Although the affidavit indicated the counsel did not
investigate the validity of the prior convictions because appellant in-
structed him "not to concern [him]self with punishment issues or evi-
dence," the Court of Criminal Appeals did not find sufficient evidence in
the record to determine whether the trial court adequately advised the
defendant on this matter.
The Court of Criminal Appeals remanded the writ application for a
hearing. The court spelled out to the trial court what it expected, the trial
court should determine what the defendant's trial counsel told him con-
cerning (1) what challenges, if any, the defendant could make against the
prior convictions; (2) the likelihood of the trial court setting them aside
on those grounds; (3) the defendant's ability to appeal the trial court's
refusal to set the prior convictions aside; and (4) the consequences of the
defendant's failure to make these challenges at trial. If the trial court
determines trial counsel advised the defendant of the matters it should
also determine why the defendant chose not to pursue the challenges.
212. Moody, 991 S.W.2d at 858.
213. 991 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
214. Id. at 839.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. 993 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
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In Phillips v. State,218 the defendant was convicted of felony driving
while intoxicated (DWI).219 The indictment alleged four prior DWI con-
victions. The State also sought to prove the defendant was a habitual
felony offender, that is, a person who has previously been convicted of
two felony offenses, with the second previous felony conviction for an
offense that occurred after the first previous conviction became final. 220
The indictment showed four previous DWIs from 1986, 1987, 1990, and
1991. The indictment also alleged that before committing the felony DWI
the defendant had been convicted of four felony offenses: DWI in 1991,
DWI in 1990, burglary of a building in 1984, and burglary of a vehicle in
1983. The two burglaries were insufficient to show that the defendant
was a habitual felony offender because the 1984 offense did not occur
after the 1983 offense became final. Therefore, the State had to show at
least one of the DWI convictions it alleged to enhance his DWI to a third
degree felony, also to show the defendant was a habitual felony offender.
The Court of Criminal Appeals determined that the penal code clearly
allows the convictions to be used either to enhance the DWI offense to a
felony, or to enhance the punishment as a habitual offender, but not
both. 22' However, it did not necessarily follow that, by not objecting to
the indictment, the defendant's assistance was rendered ineffective. 222
The court applied the second prong of the Strickland test and determined
that, if the defendant had objected to the State's use of the 1990 and 1991
DWI convictions to enhance the DWI to a felony, the State could have
amended the indictment to eliminate these allegations and the other two
DWI convictions would still be adequate to enhance the DWI to a fel-
ony.22 3 Likewise, if the defendant had objected to the use of the 1990 and
1991 DWI convictions to show that he was a habitual felony offender, the
State could have amended the indictment to eliminate either of the alle-
gations. Either of the burglaries with either of the DWIs would have
been sufficient to show defendant to be a habitual felony offender.
Therefore, the defendant could not show a reasonable probability his sen-
tence would have been different if his counsel had objected to the double
use of the prior offenses and the defendant's ineffective assistance of
counsel argument failed on the second prong of the Strickland test.22 4
218. 992 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
219. DWI is a felony only if it is shown that the person has two previous DWI convic-
tions. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.09(b) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
220. If a person who is guilty of a third degree felony such as felony DWI is shown to be
a habitual felony offender, that person may be punished by imprisonment for life or for
any term of 25 to 99 years. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d) (Vernon 2000).
221. Section 49.09(f) provides:
A conviction may be used for the purposes of enhancement under this sec-
tion which provides for enhanced offences for DWI or enhancement under
Subchapter D, Chapter 12 which provides for enhanced penalties for habit-
ual felony offenders, but not under both this section and Subchapter D.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.09(f) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
222. Phillips, 992 S.W.2d at 494.
223. Id. at 495.
224. Id.
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In Ex parte Carrio,225 a post-conviction application for habeas corpus,
the defendant's convictions of murder and attempted murder were af-
firmed on appeal. Applying fourteen years later for a writ of habeas
corpus, the defendant contended he received ineffective assistance of
counsel and his convictions should be set aside. The trial court recom-
mended relief be denied under the doctrine of laches. The Court of
Criminal Appeals had never denied relief on a valid claim due to a defen-
dant's delay in bringing the claim.226 However, federal courts recognize
the doctrine of laches in evaluating post-conviction writs of habeas corpus
and have codified the doctrine in Rule 9(a) of the Rules Governing
§ 2254 Cases.227 Reviewing the federal courts' rationale for employing
the doctrine of laches, the court determined that it could and should con-
sider laches when deciding whether to grant habeas relief.228 The court
then sent the matter back to the trial court to resolve the question of
whether the defendant's request should be denied on the basis of laches.
225. 992 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
226. Id. at 487.
227. Rule 9(a) provides as follows:
A petition may be dismissed if it appears that the state of which the respon-
dent is an officer has been prejudiced in its ability to respond to the petition
by delay in its filing unless the petitioner shows that it is based on grounds of
which he could not have had knowledge by the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence before the circumstances prejudicial to the state occurred.
28 U.S.C. § 2254.
228. Carrio, 992 S.W.2d at 488.
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